Indigenous Movements in Latin America, 1992–2004: Controversies, Ironies, New Directions

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new social movements, cultural rights, indigenous politics, public intellectuals, diversity versus essentialism

Abstract
This review examines literature on indigenous movements in Latin America from 1992 to 2004. It addresses ethnic identity and ethnic activism, in particular the reindianization processes occurring in indigenous communities throughout the region. We explore the impact that states and indigenous mobilizing efforts have had on each other, as well as the role of transnational nongovernmental organizations and para-statals organizations, neoliberalism more broadly, and armed conflict. Shifts in ethnroracial, political, and cultural indogenous discourses are examined, special attention being paid to new deployments of rhetorics concerned with political imaginations, customary law, culture, and identity. Self-representational strategies will be numerous and dynamic, identities themselves multiple, fluid, and abundantly positional. The challenges these dynamics present for anthropological field research and ethnographic writing are discussed, as is the dialogue between scholars, indigenous and not, and activists, indigenous and not. Conclusions suggest potentially fruitful research directions for the future.
INTRODUCTION

This review examines a cross-section of the literature on indigenous movements in Latin America from 1992 through 2004. This temporal framing spans important historical moments, from the Columbian quincentenary and the end of the Cold War through the stepped-up globalization of the present. We confine our focus to what we see to be some of the most important aspects of indigenous organizing, and to several undeservedly neglected issues. Enlisting the notion of shifts in activist and scholarly discourses to structure our argument, we adopt perspectives from three subject positions: states and international actors, indigenous communities (henceforth "pueblos"1), and scholars (a category that includes indigenous and nonindigenous, national and foreign scholars). We then look more closely at what we refer to as languages of implementation: altered or entirely new performative rhetorics and the discursive terrains on which they are deployed (political imaginaries, customary law, culture, and identity). We are particularly concerned to highlight the serious limitations of several analytic polarities, previously useful but now impediments more than anything else.

In 1993, Van Cott characterized the goals of Latin American indigenous movements to be self-determination and autonomy, with an emphasis on cultural distinctiveness; political reforms that involve a restructuring of the state; territorial rights and access to natural resources, including control over economic development; and reforms of military and police powers over indigenous peoples (p. 12). Our primary aim has been to highlight what we, a decade later, see to be the most important changes.

Owing to page length constraints imposed by the Annual Reviews format, this review is not a survey of the literature, nor does it address the history of indigenous organizing in Latin America. We cannot comprehensively discuss many significant epistemological issues, for example, the implications of the shift to more historicized research perspectives, nor can we construct models or typologies, systematically characterize the national movements in each country, or do more than mention some of the work on various crucial topics. Finally, we deeply regret having to limit our ability to cite the burgeoning Latin American literature, indigenous and nonindigenous, on this topic.

The topics of ethnic identity and ethnic activism now interest some of the best and brightest young scholars in anthropology and political science. Latin Americanist scholarship on these subjects alone has become a virtual industry. Surely one reason for this is the several spectacularly successful indigenous mobilizations during the 1990s, such as the indigenous uprisings in Ecuador (Selverston-Scher 2001; Van Cott 2005; Whitten 2004, pp. 62–64) and Bolivia (Van Cott 2000, Calla...
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2000). Other well-known cases are still struggling to have a sustained national impact. The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994 to protest the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Collier 1999, Harvey 1998, Rus et al. 2003, Stephen 2002) is one example, but it nonetheless managed to achieve an important measure of re-gional self-administration and self-definition in a manner previously unthinkable. Mobilizing continues to make headlines; in 2000, indigenous people helped force the Bolivian government to cancel plans to allow the Bechtel Corporation sell the country's water to its own citizens (Laurie et al. 2002, pp. 265–69).

In several countries, most spectacularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, the indigenous movement has worked to create ethno-political parties that participate at every electoral level (Albó 2002).

DISCOURSE SHIFTS—STATE, NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL


Mallon (1992) provides an illuminating comparison of state projects for a "modern" mestizo hegemony in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia. The past three decades have seen a remarkable reversal. In Ecuador groups previously seen basically as Quichua-speaking campesinos have been classified into a set of pueblos and assigned territories (Macdonald 2003). Other Andean communities that had traded their indigenous identity for a campesino one underwent processes of reindi-genization (de la Cadena 2000, Plant 2002). Brazil recognized 30 new indigenous communities in the northeast, a region previously seen to have lost its indigenous population (French 2004, p. 663; see also J. Warren 2004 on newly self-identified Brazilian Indians). State ideologies of mestizaje—which emphasize cultural and biological mixing rather than ethno-racial difference, as in Vasconcelos' "la raza cósmica" ("the cosmic race," see Alonso 2004)—shifted to identities that valorized difference, in particular Indianess. Constitutional reforms recognizing multicultural nations containing plural citizenries occurred in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela.

These changes took place in states that, although hardly withering away, were becoming "increasingly porous as the boundaries between the state and society change [in an] increasingly plural and transnationalized international context" (Siedler 2002, p. 201). Various transnational social movements (human rights, women's rights, environmental) have proliferated. In many ways the indigenious rights movement itself was "born transnational" (Brysk 1995, Tilley 2002). Transnational organizing and coalition building opened up new opportunities for pueblos to influence national legislative agendas, and many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that specialize in development or human rights came to see indigenous peoples as clients (Brysk 2000). Many Latin American countries signed international human rights treaties and covenants: The leverage provided by the 1989 International Labor Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 has been especially far-reaching (Gray 1997, pp. 13–20). With their claims of collective grievances and rights, indigen ous organizations challenged democratic liberalism's focus on the individual rights.

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NGOs: nongovernmental organizations
Neoliberal reforms: intended to help resolve the fiscal, legitimacy, and governability crises faced by Latin American countries and responsibilities of undifferentiated “citizens” (Hodgson 2002, p. 1092; Muehlebach 2001; Yashar 2005).

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to resolve fiscal, legitimacy, and governability crises, many Latin American states agreed to adopt neoliberal reforms to promote democratization, economic liberalization, and decentralization. Neoliberalism argues that privatization and decentralization will result in a less corrupt and less bloated government, one less dependent on clientelist relations to get things done. A concomitant “social adjustment” (Alvarez et al. 1998, p. 22) should be made, with measures taken to foster movement toward a more participatory civil society and to take up the slack resulting from decreases in social services. Appeals to diversity, to a pluralist state in which everyone participates, further this “social adjustment” goal, and so it is not surprising that in some cases neoliberal models and policies have favored pueblos’ agendas. Pressure from international NGOs and bodies like the United Nations has resulted in states recognizing rights to difference, which allows indigenous activists and groups to make claims that enlist discourses about tradition and community that resonate with neoliberal discourses on community solidarity and social capital (Siedel 2002, p. 18).

Abundant evidence exists showing that sustained struggle and compromise have been necessary for the passing and implementing of these reforms. Striking changes have indeed occurred. A general shift from totalitarian and authoritarian to democratic government took place, a Marxist paradigm that saw organizing for cultural and historical recovery to be mistaken and regressive declined, older assimilationist indigenism lost ground, and new debates and new legal forms resulted in a greater inclusion of indigenous peoples in the national political process. Ethnic groups increasingly came to be seen as “contemporary sociocultural configurations strongly articulated within national society” able to “become a political force without renouncing their identities or demands” (Díaz Polanco 1997, p. 988). But constitutions and peace accords may complicate implementation of their echoing of the idealized rhetoric of international norms in a way that is particularly vague and ambiguous, sometimes deliberately so (Assies et al. 2000, p. 297). In addition, many of the older power structures remained. Authors, indigenous and nonindigenous alike, point out the numerous ways that ethnic and racial discrimination continue to be so deeply embedded that the relationship between citizen and state remains far from democratic (Jelin 1996, pp. 109–10; Schirmer 1996). Indigenous organizing and resistance continue to exact a high toll, with thousands of leaders being assassinated. And during the past three decades, armed conflict, especially in Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, has produced severe political repression, hundreds of thousands of indigenous deaths, and over a million indigenous refugees and internally displaced persons.

As Yashar points out (2005), the adoption of multicultural citizenship reforms by Latin American states did not occur solely because of outside pressure, and scholars have hypothesized about possible contributing domestic reasons. Some scholars believe multicultural citizenship reforms appealed to ruling elites as a way for the state to signal its citizens that it was attending to their interests, despite a decreasing ability to meet material demands (Van Cott 2000; D.L. Van Cott, forthcoming2). Authors such as Hale (2002) argue that states provide favorable terms to certain indigenous groups to reject the more radical demands of others. Other scholars argue that the negative impact of fiscal austerity measures on pueblos’ local autonomy and livelihoods provided the impetus for increased ethnic mobilization, some of it successful enough to force states to negotiate (Brysk 2000, Yashar 1999).

Yashar (1996) argues that those left at the margins of this new wave of democratization soon discovered that ethnicity was a powerful language for social mobilizing and political demands.

A substantial number of authors discuss instances in which indigenousness and multiculturalism have bolstered neo-liberal ideology by reinforcing decentralized governance and market policies (Giordani 2002, p. 86). Plant (2002) provides a valuable country-by-country comparison of the relationship between cultural identity maintenance, legislation around land titling, and the effects of neoliberal policies aimed at dismantling corporate agrarian structures.

The impact of neoliberal reforms on indigenous mobilizing is hotly debated. Clearly, the reforms, in their efforts to strengthen civil society through policies of decentralization, have provided both new constraints and opportunities for pueblos seeking recognition and expanded power (Hodgson 2002, p. 1092). Some authors see neo-liberalism's move to a strategy of what Mexican President Vicente Fox terms "government of business, by business, for business" (Speed 2002, p. 223) to be an unmitigated disaster. Certainly the negative effects of structural adjustment, privatization, and rollbacks of state services on national economies and local-level employment result in adverse consequences for pueblos. Sturm (SAR 2004, p. 16) argues that neoliberalism offers a thinly veiled racism of a new variety. Neoliberal ideology's emphasis on culture, class individualism, and choice, she argues, denies the persistence of economic marginalization and structural racism, as well as the meaningfulness of race at all. Neoliberalism's professed multicultural neutrality allows unique historical and political forms of oppression to be glossed over. An illusion of a level playing field is created, and issues of race, power, and privilege are obscured.

Overall, neoliberal reforms have been deeply contradictory for Latin America's indigenous people. They have opened political space and encouraged so-called local control and decision making over the development process, while generating tensions in rural communities over issues such as unfunded mandates, local taxes, and land alienations that diminish the resources on which their livelihoods depend (Benson 2004; Hodgson 2002, p. 1092). The struggles of Colombia's U'wa to resist Occidental Petroleum's plans for seismic testing and well digging illustrate that collective title to land may not suffice when governments retain subsoil rights (Jackson 2002b, pp. 96–98). Critics argue that scrutinizing the politics of development will reveal that state and industry support follows a logic of development that rests on a confidence that most often the communities "will be forced by circumstances to put these resources at the disposal of industry" (Dombrowski 2002, p. 1068).

**DISCOURSE SHIFTS—PUEBLOS**

The politics being pursued by pueblos—demanding and attaining national and international recognition of their identity and the legitimacy of their claims—has shown that adopting an overall strategy of cultural and historical recovery and revival is often the best route for achieving a degree of autonomy and self-determination, as well as convincing funders and legislators of the reasonableness of other kinds of claims, such as titling a traditional collective land tenure system. Securing collective land rights has proved more likely when pueblos successfully convince government bureaucrats and the courts of the validity of indigenous understandings of native identity and practices. These campaigns have pushed for a much more comprehensive notion of territory. Rather than simply the land itself, territory is seen to be a crucial foundation for self-determination, a "fundamental and multidimensional space for the creation and recreation of the social, economic, and cultural values and practices of the communities" (Alvarez et al. 1998, p. 20). Minimally, pueblo autonomy should include land,
resources, and normative and administrative space [Cojí Cuxil 1994; Sieder 2002, p. 7; see Kearney & Varese (1995, p. 228) on the link between territory and ethnic groups as juridi
cal subjects].

This kind of "politics of recognition" (Taylor 1994) takes place in complex fields of power and has required that indigenous identity itself be turned into a strategy, a political opportunity structure—which does not mean that, by so doing, it somehow loses cultural and historical content. Even goals more ex
plicitly development oriented, such as obtaining access to training and resources to modify traditional subsistence modes or raise the quality of education and health status, are articulated in terms that insist on these goals being accomplished in culturally appropriate ways.

The cultural and historical recovery strateg 
ey recognizes that if pueblos are to succeed with their political agendas they need to per
form their indigenous difference to gain the authority to speak and be listened to. Laurie et al. (2002) argue that the political culture within which indigenous struggles occur relies mostly upon such representations of indige
neousness "rather than on established criteria, self-determination and/or self-identification (in spite of what the legislation might suggest)" (p. 270; also see Briones 2003). Garfield (2001) describes the process by which the Brazilian Xavante realized that emphasizing positive stereotypes of Indians as ecologists and as the first Brazilian nationalists would optimally help them with their land claims (see also Graham 2002). Not all mobiliz
ing that employed such argumentation suc

Pueblo performances are intended for a va
diety of audiences: other indigenous groups as well as national and international actors (Conkin 1997, Graham 2002, Turner 2002). Especially when polemical, these perfor
tances can be tactically misconstrued by critics of indigenous empowerment. Oppo
nents who take the position that any po
titical assertiveness threatens race war, and that any demand for self-determination is tantamount to a desire for secession, seem to assume that, unlike politicians in general, indigenous polemic must be taken literally (Falk 2001). Criticism that conjures up images of "balkanization" (Giordani 2002, p. 81), that sees indigenous leaders as dupes of "agitators" from other countries, or that as
ters that ethnic revitalization projects impede the country's journey toward modernity make for good copy in the morning newspaper and good strategies for mobilizing nonindigenous voters. In fact, indige
nous claims to self-determination and auton
omy do not include secessionist projects, even though some indigenous intellectuals will argue that that right must never be ceded (Cojí Cuxil 1997). For the most part indigenous activist rhetoric and practices have emphasized other goals and demands such as ed
ucation, judicial restructuring, and land re
forms. Indigenous complaints tend to decry a rejecting, exclusionary state, a state run by elites interested in maintaining power above the needs of the poor. "Nunca más un México sin nosotros!" ("never again a Mexico without us!") expresses the aims of the vast ma
jority of indigenous organizations (Rus et al. 2003). Harvey (1998) argues that the Zapatista rebellion represents a new form of rural protest because it sparked broader efforts both to change the way pueblos throughout Mex
ico were represented in state discourse and to bring about democratic elections. Ecua
dorian indigenous activism prioritizes inclu
sion and participation: The Pachacutik party and the indigenous movement in general present themselves "not simply as a new and legitimate political party but also as a van
guard for advancing broad popular participa
tion and democratization" (Macdonald 2003, p. 10). Zamosc (2003) points out that Ecuador
ian natives who protest integration are re
jecting the agenda of cultural homogenization
CONAIE: Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
COCEI: Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus

CONAIE, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, has also followed a collaborationist politics, seeking to include other sectors of civil society in the dialogue. De la Cadena (2001) analyzes Peruvian indigenous politicians’ demands for political space to participate as literate indigenous activists, an oxymoronic status prior to this struggle (p. 257). Warren (1998) points out that Mayas who challenged the Guatemalan model of “national culture” (p. 195) did not necessarily reject the notion of a unified Guatemala.

An especially telling reply to accusations of indigenous “threats to the state” is found in indigenous leaders’ rhetoric in the many mass demonstrations protesting governments’ invitations to multinational capital to conduct what are perceived as land or subsoil resource grabs. Their protests express a form of nationalism and patriotism (Stephen 1997) that is opposed to a corrupt, incompetent, sell-out government. Some of the most effective speeches and position papers coming out of the movement make inclusive, populist arguments in favor of putting the nation (one that is multicultural, multilingual, and pluri-ethnic, of course) first and foremost. Such rhetoric simply did not appear during the 1980s and early 1990s. The impressive levantamientos (uprisings) in Ecuador and Bolivia (Brysk 2004, pp. 28–31; Macdonald 2002) were the opposite of secessionist strategies; their platforms critiqued governmental willingness to sell a country’s patrimony to foreign interests and protested governmental indifference to the consequences of structural adjustment squeezes on those sectors of impoverished citizens who could least withstand it. Here we see indigenous organizing that represents the concerns of a wider constituency facing a common enemy.

Scholars will need to continue their analyses of the tensions activists encounter between emphasis on organizing at the national versus the pueblo level. We see such tensions most particularly in Guatemala (Montejo 2005, Velázquez Nimatuj 2005). They are also apparent in Bolivia, where espousal of Aymara superiority cost activists like Felipe Quispe support from lowland pueblos (Langer & Muñoz 2003, p. 205). Ecuadorian activist Nina Pacari urges Shuar to identify as Shuar, not simply as indigenous citizens (Langer & Muñoz 2003, p. 204).

Researchers who become deeply involved with indigenous organizations are able to see factualism developing and analyze its causes—a substantial contribution. For example, Bastos & Camus analyze the complex relation of culturalists and grassroots leftists, among them popular Mayas in Guatemala’s Pan-Mayanism (1995, 1996). Campbell (1996) notes that as the Mexican government granted greater legitimacy to COCEI (Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus) internal tensions seemed to be on the rise, which suggests that without the threat of repression and sense of urgency, ethnic and class solidarity may not be enough to thwart internal factualism.

Ethnographic research is also needed into the various ways a pueblo’s (or indigenous organization’s) agendas are vulnerable to international NGO pressure to comply with their political and economic agendas (Tilley 2002). Clearly, a pueblo’s ability to critique NGOs and dependence on donor funds will affect its self-representation, both to the outside and to themselves (Ramos 1994, Raxce’ 1995; see Varese 1996) on the indigenous activist/conservationist alliance, and see Chapin (2004) on neoliberalism’s impact on it.

The terms with which many pueblos represent themselves are fluid and temporary, any binaries quickly dissolving. Castañeda (2004) describes the term Maya as “an embattled zone of contestation of belonging, identity, and differentiation” (p. 41). Schwitter (2003) describes Kollas as articulating the language of national citizenship and the language of indigeneity (p. 146). Pueblo discourse about indigenous identity is especially fluid and multiple in land claims. Ramirez (2002) describes the emergence of a new indigenous group in...
Colombia's Putumayo who, realizing that "Indians exist by virtue of the state's legal system," acquired legal ethnic group status, despite pueblos in the region arguing that the claim was "imaginary" (pp. 142–47). Chaves (2001) describes a tug-of-war between Putumayo colonas (settlers) claiming to be indigenous and the director of the National Office of Indian Affairs. Colombia's Chocó province offers an example of "white" and "Indian" families being included in the definition of a "black community" that is seeking land title. The right to "be black" for the purposes of the land claim derives from black-indigenous intermarriage or from histories of cooperation, exchange, and sharing (Wade 2002, p. 19). Wade describes how the Colombian state "indianizes" these communities.

SHIFTS IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE

Anthropologists have led the drive to embrace more culturalist approaches, paying attention to the fluidity of ethno-racial meanings and how they are constructed, negotiated, and reconstituted. Simply put, the cultural is political and the political is cultural (Alvarez et al. 1998). K.B. Warren (2001) characterizes recent scholarship as turning "away from culture as uniformity to the study of social and cultural heterogeneity, the ethnographic concern with multiple identities and their lines of interaction rather than the privileging of ethnicity as more foundational than other identifications, and the engagement with competing discourses of identity rather than essentialized renderings of authenticity" (p. 94). The most interesting recent work employs methodologies that continue the anthropological tradition of long-term, intense, face-to-face research; however, it takes place at multiple sites. Investigators examine a variety of intersubjectivities involving, for example, indigenous activists; translocal, nonindigenous activist "collaborators"; and practitioners from regional, national, and international institutions. Marcus sees such "mobile ethnography" as an attempt to "examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space" (1998, p. 79). The challenges are considerable, given the discipline's emphasis on achieving a deep understanding of small-scale communities, including local systems of knowledge.

Although Latin American anthropology always assumed that activism and scholarship go together—scholars like Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Alcida Ramos, Myriam Jimeno, Stefano Varese, Nellie Arvelo-Jimenez, and Manuela Carneiro da Cunha come to mind—only recently have North American and European scholars problematized and blurred the distinction in their actual fieldwork, rejecting earlier orthodoxies that stressed the need for activist scholars to keep their partisan activities separate from their "scientific" work. (Of course, anthropologists throughout the hemisphere have been writing about their activist concerns for decades.) Innovative research designs assign to the anthropologist roles such as secretary or translator during meetings; participant in marches, demonstrations, and blockades; and workshop leader. Sawyer (2004) assumed a strong advocacy position from the very beginning of her fieldwork on Ecuadorian indigenous mobilizations that were protesting multinational oil extraction in the Oriente section of the country. Other examples are England's (see 2003) involvement in the Maya language revival movement for some 30 years, and Speed's participation as an observer in a Civilian Peace Camp in Chiapas in May 1995 (2002). Articles and ethnographies emerging from this sort of research are packed with the kind of information so often absent in political science analyses of these very processes. There would have been no way to observe 99% of what Sawyer reports had she not signed on as a supporter. It is difficult to imagine how a researcher could avoid taking a stand on such important issues (Starr 1991). Ethnographic practice that bridges inquiry, activism, and participatory approaches to the production of cultural knowledge raises complex questions, epis...
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epistemological and ethical, answers to which are not exactly around the corner (see Field 1998; Hale 2004; Jackson 1999; Warren & Jackson 2002b, pp. 8–11). But at least the issues are being productively reframed. Activist researchers do try to be as objective as possible, producing comprehensive, systematic, theoretically engaged work that reflexively speaks to some of the dilemmas with which they wrestle.

Recent scholarship illustrates why certain dichotomies and concepts, useful in earlier analyses, now hinder more than help. One overly simple dichotomy constructs difference uniquely in terms of an “indigenous/nonindigenous” or “same/other” division. All the ways in which pueblos are resignifying indigenousness unfailingly demonstrate that underneath such binaries are complex, nuanced, and, above all, dynamic meaning structures. The dichotomy between indigenous and nonindigenous is never unproblematic, but this fact does not deny that such a binary exists. It does mean that we must constantly resist seeing it as a natural, straightforward, uncomplicated division. The literature provides many fascinating examples of “indigenousness” being resignified in novel ways. For example, to what degree does being able to speak to power (i.e., be fluent in a colonizer language) disqualify the speaker? Such fluency may mean that a speaker has permanently traversed a cultural and ideological boundary and hence can no longer be bilingual and bicultural (Rappaport 2005). This fraught aspect of the politics-of-culture issue puts a new spin on the “Can the subaltern speak?” question. Rappaport illustrates the meagerness of the “same/other” dichotomy with a description of complex gradations of Otherness in her work with a variety of indigenous intellectuals in Cauca, Colombia. Field provides an example from western Nicaragua, which, like Northeastern Brazil and El Salvador (Tilley 2002), was officially seen to have lost its indigenous populations. One community Field studied (1998) did not become involved with the indigenous movement, even though they saw themselves as indigenous, whereas another community aligned its families with the regional indigenous movement, even though craftswomen had earlier “proudly maintained” the mestiza origin of their ceramic production (p. 432).

The contrasts between community-based versus individual-based indigenous identity also point out subtle gradations between “same” and “other.” Occhipinti (2003) describes how members of a community saw it becoming Kolla when its claim to that identity succeeded, regardless of whether they felt a strong sense of Kolla identity (p. 160). Similarly, Speed (2002) saw processes she characterizes as “being and becoming indigenous” in Chiapas to occur at the community level, during discussions concerned with “declaring ourselves a ‘pueblo indigena’” (p. 212).

As with territory, ways in which language is seen to signal, confer, and validate indigenousness continue to require examination. Many authors write on the problematic equation of language = ethnic identity. Brown (1996) describes language “as both the external and internal symbol of a people [and as] a crucial element in emerging ethnic presentation” (p. 206). It is obvious that language often represents a people in all kinds of ways, its loss seen as a tragedy, but this is not the whole story. Garzón et al. (1998) describe a switch generation of indigenous Spanish speakers in Guatemala that reflected a new domestic family economic strategy. Early cultural activists often came from such families and, as a result, had to relearn their community’s indigenous languages as they advocated for official language recognition. Yet speaking Guaraní in Paraguay or Mexican (Nahuatl) in Mexico does not mark indigeneity, and dominant societal appropriations of indigenous lexicon to stigmatize indigeneity also occur: Whitten’s (2003) examples of Quichua used by elite Ecuadorians (p. 69) resemble the “mock Spanish” described by Hill (1999). Various institutional authorities try to require some form of link between cultural markers, such as language, and cultural identities.
In the past, some states required a person who had moved out of a community to speak its language still or be classified as “used to be indigenous.” Today, however, such policies may be overruled, so dynamic are these politics, local and national. In sum, cases exist where pueblos do not speak their traditional language, other cases where nonindigenous populations do speak a traditional language, and still other cases where people speaking a language feign total ignorance of it (Castañeda 2004, p. 41).

The processes by which collective historical struggle, a common ancestry of suffering, confers indigenousness are examined by several authors. Sam Colop (1996) and Montejo & Akab’ (1992, Montejo 1999) speak of a view of indigenous identity as shaped by a history of resistance to nation-states. Field (1998) notes that this requires the anthropologist “to uncover and describe the specific historical conditions producing elements of identity, attending to their dynamically continuous transformations” (p. 432). Rappaport & Dover (1996) speak of the “romance of resistance” enhancing a multi-pueblo Colombian indigenous organization’s sense of being united through a history of struggle. Gray (1997) sees consciousness of indigenousness to emerge “when a people senses the injustices of colonization” (p. 23); see also Pallares 2004). Speed (2002) describes the inhabitants of the town of Nicolás Ruíz saying that they are recovering their lost Tzeltal culture because “[t]he truth is, we are Tzeltales...in the struggle with indigenous people” (p. 217).

The overly simple dichotomy of “traditional” and “modern” does not satisfactorily characterize the complex divisions described in most recent publications. Kearney (1996) and Warren & Jackson (2002b) argue that Latin America’s native peoples are increasingly to be seen as transnationalized, urban, proletarian, border-crossing, bilingual and trilingual, and professional. Kearney & Varese (1995, pp. 215–21) describe the present “postdevelopment era” as characterized by neither wholly modern nor traditional indigenous identities (also see Martínez 2004). Sturn (2003; see also 1999), writing about Peru’s rondas (self-defense organizations that arose during the period of extreme violence involving “Shining Path” guerrillas and the state’s counter-insurgency forces), judiciously critiques García Canclini’s (1995) analytic model based on this opposition. Laurie et al. (2002) argue that indigenous identities in Bolivia are being reconstituted in nondichotomous terms, neither wholly modern nor traditional (p. 233); the same is true for many Colombian pueblos (Gow & Rappaport 2002). Cojti Cuixil (2002) and Warren (1998) also provide examples of an emerging urban, cosmopolitan, and professional class of Mayas, as do authors in Fischer & Brown (1996) and Watanabe & Fischer (2004). Plant’s (2002) concise discussion of the debate over whether indigenous identity should be seen as based in a particular economic system, or in a relationship with the land and environment, also points out the problems with standards based on “traditional” behavior (pp. 212–14).

Authors also attend to official constructions of the “traditional.” Briggs notes that the opposition between “traditional subjects,” who are inexorably embedded in local environments, and “cosmopolitan subjects” has been a central epistemological and political component of modern discourses since the seventeenth century (Bauman & Briggs 2003, p. 133, as cited in Briggs 2004, p. 176). Would-be demonstrators, en route to protest Venezuela’s handling of a cholera epidemic, were targeted at military checkpoints set up to block “any body that looked indigena” from leaving. Although these activists knew they were participating in a transnational indigenous movement, the government had other plans: to fix them in “traditional” and “local” identity spaces.

Another overly simple conventional polarity is that between “authentic” (a thoroughly Western concept) and its opposite—inauthentic, fake, invented, new, modern, Western, etc. When culture becomes a form...
of empowerment, mobilizing around that empowerment may seem fraudulent precisely because it is politicized. State challenges made to indigenous individuals and communities may take the form of claims that they are "no longer indigenous" because of their "un-traditional" behavior. More specific political challenges to urban-based activism have been used by their opponents in attempts to delegitimize leaders. The argument that individuals do (or do not) represent their indigenous people beings the processual question of who represents whom in all facets of political life.

A revealing variant on the theme of a state's challenges to a group's authenticity (and hence legitimacy) is the Argentine government's challenges to sectors of its Guarani citizens. Although their indigeneity is unproblematic, they are accused of being so influenced by Bolivian Guarani that their status as Argentineans has been compromised (Hirsch 2003, Schwittay 2003). Note that indigenous groups as well as critics of the movement actively employ the "authenticity" card in their internal and external politics (Turner 2002, Ramirez 2002).

Anthropology, with its current more dynamic notion of culture, sees no absolute standard of authenticity. Rather, our focus is on the authenticators—on the authorities in indigenous communities and the experts beyond who determine what is deemed authentic at any one time. Critics with their narrow model of indigenous leadership have not accepted that, in fact, indigenous leaders will range from tribal headmen and ritual elders to urban university-trained leaders. Several authors interpret examples of indigenous movements' appropriation of occidental notions of authentic tradition to be moves toward safeguarding tradition and resisting hegemony and not examples of co-optation and consequent "inauthenticity." Assies (2000) describes indigenous women in Chiapas contesting a tradition that excludes them from participation in political decision-making and in so doing vindicating their role in processes of ethnic reorganization (p. 18). Garfield (2001) saw the Xavante employing the legal and political tools of their oppressors in their land claim struggles. Maya leaders work to appropriate elements of Western culture and reappropriate elements of their own history to create a cultural identity that is viable in the global political economy, and marked as uniquely theirs (Fischer 1996). In sum, cultural continuity can appear as the mode of cultural change (Wade 1997). Ethnogenesis (Mallon 1996, Smith 1990, Hill 1997) is always an already-ongoing process; it merely speeds up during times of ruptures, disjunctures, and transitions.

Researchers' write-ups of their work with indigenous intellectuals illustrate the complex imaginings and reimaginings of what is involved in being "modern," especially when some people, indigenous and not, see modernity to be opposed to the "authentically" indigenous leader (Rappaport 2005). Some indigenous intellectuals who work in community development projects develop attitudes and perspectives that allow them to identify both as indigenous and as members of mainstream society. Indigenous communities can and do question the appropriateness of some leaders' choices, seeing them as "dirigentes de maletín y corbata" (briefcase and tie leaders) (Giordani 2002, p. 80), but in general their indigenousness will not be automatically rejected.

By "essentialism," anthropologists mean the process of freezing and reifying an identity in a way that hides the historical processes and politics within which it develops. Of course one has to study whose interests are served in this process. Racist forms of economic production and state authority use essentializing strategies in public policy and clandestine operations to justify violence, perpetuate hierarchies of human value and reward, and leave unquestioned the neglect of certain sectors of their populations as something less than human. The focus on the "other" by these authorities seeks to obscure that there is a "self" acting in its own interest.

Indigenous "self-essentializing" by contrast is seen by many anthropologists as a
political tactic used by indigenous movements in Latin America to push for greater autonomy and self-government (see Rubin 2004, pp. 124–30). Frequently encountered assumptions that indigenous women must be traditional culture place-holders for their pueblo exemplify an essentialist strategy. De la Cadena (2000) describes how highland Peruvian women are constructed as “more Indian” because they are less likely to speak Spanish or travel to urban centers and more likely to wear traditional dress and be assigned duties that are seen as more traditional—all of which results in a second-class status of women and “the female” in Andean societies. Nelson argues that Maya women are expected to play what she terms the *mujer maya*'s role, which functions to ground the Maya movement “so that urban Maya hackers can soar into transnational idioms and cyberspace.” Confronting a long tradition of research that finds women to be bearers of traditional culture, conservative, monolingual, rural, and out of place—alien—when they leave their homes, Nelson (1999) denaturalizes these images, analyzing all the ways in which they prop up not only the pan-Mayan movement’s ideology, but Guatemalan national identity as well. Hendrickson (1996) describes how Guatemalan Mayan women’s costume—*traje*—“remains outside the broader Maya Movement due to the difficulties in locating a place for weaving and women in the movement” (p. 163; see also Dean (2003) on lowland Peru and Radcliffe (2000) on the Ecuadorian situation).

Scholars also describe ways in which marginalized sectors, such as women, within indigenous communities in Chiapas are beginning to “refashion and reclaim ‘tradition’—here cultural prescriptions intended to keep women on the margins of political process—in order to advance their own demands for greater participation and independence” (Sieder 2002, p. 193). Hernández (1997) describes women from the organic producers movement arguing in favor of indigenous women’s rights during the negotiations between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government. Sieder (2002) comments that finding a balance between communal rights and individual rights connected to gender equality, religious freedom, and property rights tends to be particularly contentious (pp. 11–12). Nash (2001) documents how Mayan women maneuvered to influence changes in their favor during this period; she also notes a backlash of gender hostility. She argues that for scholars to render illegitimate these self-essentializing maneuvers limits these women’s chances to organize in their own best interests for goals such as greater accountability of those in power, democratic inclusion, better work conditions and higher wages, civil and political rights, and cultural autonomy.

Many authors also wrestle with finding effective ways to describe identity processes that are flexible and fluid. We have accounts of indianness occurring here and deindianness occurring there (e.g., Radcliffe 2000). What indigenous identity means, for both scholar and pueblo, can become quite unstable when all actors are repeatedly modifying their discourses in response to the ever-shifting terms of engagement. De la Cadena (2001, p. 255) notes that the idea of difference is complicated if it is seen to emerge from coparticipation in the same historical time, a point also made by Wilson (1995), who sees it as “an incredibly slippery notion” (p. 6). Identity is better seen as a paradox rather than a statement, he says, for as soon as such a statement is made, it blurs and dissolves.

However, even now some authors still find themselves having to respond to critics who insist, for example, that a certain population is “really” campesino rather than indigenous. Gordillo & Hirsch (2003) argue that all such labels represent a group’s particular positioning, which is derived from the social relations from which their meaning as historical subjects emerges. A positioning of campesino, then, is no more “valid” than a positioning as a member of a “pueblo
ights during apatistas and Iieder (2002) once between 1 rights conscious, particularly (2001) documented to during this of gender lars to rendering maneuvres in order to organize goals such in power, k conditions critical rights, with finding ty processes we accounts and deind- 000). What both scholar stable when up their dissiting terms 301, p. 255 complicated participation in also made by a incredibly better seen, he says, ade, it blurs ours still find critics who population indigenous. te that all particular from the r meaning positioning are "valid" of a "pueblo originario" (p. 180). A number of essays cite Li (2000, p. 151) on this issue: "Al group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable, but neither is it simply invented, adopted, or imposed. It is, rather, a positioning that draws upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and emerges through particular patterns of engagement and struggle."

Clearly, identities are not just fluid, nor just multiple, they are fluidly multiple and always relational, which presents an analytical and conceptual challenge to anthropologists. Speed (2002) notes that "states, indigenous groups, and even social scientists, often find such fluidity contrary to their different understandings and goals" (p. 222). Part of the problem lies with the analytic tasks at hand—applying a language that specifies, defines, and pinpoints to very dynamic situations. Different actors define and try to impose particular, often competing, meanings. Some Peruvian groups self-identify as mestizos but still see themselves as indigenous (de la Cadena 2001, p. 263). Although the Guatemalan state and wider publics find the “Indian-Ladino” distinction useful for its homogenizing function, Little-Siebold (2001) finds fluid and bidirectional uses of identity labels (p. 193; see also Smith 1990). These usages alter the paired terms’ dominant meaning, although the dichotomy does not disappear entirely. Castañeda (2004) provocatively asks, “Are all Maya Maya?” (p. 38), and describes a friend who, although self-identifying as Maya, adamantly maintained “we are not indigenous!” (p. 38). Castañeda sees this position to be a refusal “to be slotted into the ‘savage-slot’ of the rebellious Indio” (p. 38). He argues that Yucatec Maya have not only another politics but another modality of identity. Warren (1998) argues that identities and identity politics are shaped by the tensions between different historical generations of activists and their critics—indigenous and nonindigenous alike—in communities and on the national scene. A collection of essays in the Journal of Latin American Anthropology (2001) on the Guatemalan indigenous-ladino dichotomy shows why words like “contradiction” and “paradox” so often appear in literature on such identity labels.

The reality of a multiplicity of identities disallows any framework that proposes any single identity, albeit a composite one, because the notion of “multiple identities” still implies separate, distinct identities. Anthropology deserves credit for advancing beyond thinking in terms of ethnicity and race as the foundational dimensions for study, but the race/ethnicity/class/gender paradigm raises its own set of problems because it continues to see a unit—individual or community—as possessing an identity. Recent field research demonstrates the need to challenge this mode of conceptualization, although not so far as to claim that “identity” does not exist. Rather, again, identity is to be seen as a fluid, dynamic process. The idea of there being multiple ways of being indigenous is the optimal way to look at individuals, pueblos, and organizations. This perspective allows us to acknowledge a process of self-definition that takes us beyond the identity being asserted at a particular time and place to where we can ask, “Asserted by whom?” and “After what kinds of negotiations?” Literature that examines intersections between indigenous identity and other identity components like religion, race, and gender clearly demonstrates how crucial it is always to see identities in the plural, their formation in processual terms, and rather than asking questions like “What characterizes X identity?” asking “What are the ways of being X at this time and in this place?”

Resonating with the need to think of multiple ways of being indigenous is an equivalent need to analyze adequately the different kinds of citizenship emerging in new “civil society” discourses and practices. We have seen that multiculturalist distinctions, often inscribed into constitutions, stipulate that indigenous individuals and collectivities

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are to participate in the political process as both regular citizens of a country and as special, indigenous citizens. Scholars argue that differential treatment for historically discriminated and marginalized groups is necessary for them to attain equal citizenship. Rhetoric concerned with democracy and civil society, in fact, reveals complex moves around the citizenship trope. Scholarship increasingly attends to processes that produce and contest differentiated citizenship, ethnic citizenship, and cultural citizenship. This is an interesting play on Ong’s (1999) notion of graduated citizenship and illustrates the need to problematize the notion of civil society, which in some contexts has been overserved or underspecified to the point of being evacuated of meaning (Rajagopal 2003, pp. 258–61).

In sum, the recent literature discusses the substantial problems and challenges faced by anyone—scholars, pueblos, the state, international institutions—who attempts to get a fix on defining indigenousness. Anthropologists and historians, no less than governments pursuing racialized nation-building projects, need categories, but the recent literature provides ample evidence that signifiers are not always accepted by their intended signifieds—the actual populations may have other classificatory agendas. It is very clear that knowing who is doing the pointing is crucial. Yes, “Indians” were created by European colonialism and the New World–born Spanish criollo elites who assumed power following independence. And certainly the notions of “indigenous” adopted in the indigenista policies of many Latin American governments (and many NGOs) prior to the 1980s no longer work. But equally obvious is the impossibility of substituting a new definition for highly dialogic identity labels such as these. One lesson of such an attempt is that ethnic labels are often politicized in ways that make them indexes for ideological alignments and loyalties that stand outside ethnic identity per se.

DISCOURSE SHIFTS: LANGUAGES OF POLITICAL PRACTICE AND IMPLEMENTATION

Indigenous Political Imaginaries

Several authors address how movements develop an imaginary, an attitude, a stance in regard to the dominant society. The stances taken by a given movement can significantly influence decision making about, for example, alliance building with nonindigenous sectors such as labor unions or environmentalist and human rights groups. The stances also influence choices about whether to operate within, as opposed to totally outside, the system. Guatemalan Pan-Mayanists have spoken of a utopian goal of a separate Mayan nation or a radical federalism, both organized on the basis of regional Mayan languages, which would give them administrative control over the western highlands (Cojti Cuzil 1994). Strategically, however, they focused on creating hundreds of small organizations dedicated to cultural and language revitalization, founding alternative Mayan elementary schools and training shamans, professional linguists, publishers, and other activist professionals.

Opposition from the ruling powers not only will shape a movement’s self-image and forms of resistance, but also at times will paradoxically ensure that a national indigenous consciousness will develop. Both Reed (2002) and Horst (2003, p. 127) show how the extremely difficult struggle during the Stroessner regime in Paraguay helped indigenous activists from disparate pueblos identify themselves as a concerted lobby bloc opposed to an economic and social agenda that ignored their concerns. O’Connor (2003) notes that although resistance has a long history in Ecuador, earlier strategies were primarily re-actionary, lacking long-term, widespread, or alternative solutions to oppression. Here, too, the development of national and even transnational strategies resulted in part from frustration following unsuccessful local actions.
Political mobilizations that were able to unify highland and lowland populations in national protests, notably in Bolivia and Ecuador, were strengthened by the sense that they were organizing against a common enemy.

**Customary Law**

Although indigenous communities have always been granted a degree of autonomy to run their internal affairs, most countries are fashioning an interface between positivist Western law and indigenous legal systems that give local authorities much more latitude than before, in particular to adjudicate criminal cases. Certain fundamental rights, however, must be observed: no executions, torture, or banishment. Authors addressing these issues find contradictions in both the legislation and its enforcement with respect to indigenous authorities' right to judge, detain, establish sanctions, and punish. Stavenhagen (2002, p. 33) discusses how Colombia's Constitutional Court decisions resulted in indigenous juridical autonomy prevailing to the greatest extent in Latin America. Specific rulings by the Court show an official apparatus that is seriously attempting to instantiate the country's status as a multicultural and pluri-ethnic nation. Its encounters with customary law, derived from world views and cultural practices that are at times simply incommensurate with Western culture, make for fascinating reading (see Sánchez 2000). Local juridical systems rely on methodologies legitimated by cosmological forces and sometimes require shamanic consultations, assumptions and authorizations that differ fundamentally from Western notions of justice, due process, and conflict resolution (see Gray 1997; Jackson 2002a, p. 119).

Although positivist and customary law are always opposed in the literature, after a comprehensive examination of institutionalized plural jurisprudence being implemented in an actual local setting, Sierra (1995) concluded that the dichotomy between law and custom dissolves in actual situations: Given that interaction between the official juridical bodies and pueblos produces transformation in both, a more complex model of dispute resolution is needed.

Specific rulings employing customary law are sometimes disputed within indigenous communities themselves, resulting in individuals appealing their sentence by turning to Western courts. Local decisions may be challenged as discriminatory, authoritarian, or intrusive into private space. For example, is detaining and forcing someone to work a crime against individual liberty or the legitimate act of ronda authorities (Yrigoyen 2002, p. 174)? As Stavenhagen (2002) points out, this kind of serious negotiation and renegotiation always reflects changing political and economic circumstances (p. 39), "[L]egal pluralism should be seen as a plurality of continually evolving and interconnected processes enmeshed in wider power relations" (Siedler 2002, p. 201). An incompatibility between liberal Western concepts of universal human rights and culture-specific collective rights is often the nub of the problem. Authors will cite Kymlicka's (1996) argument that as long as an individual can leave a community, then certain restrictions on individual freedoms within it are justifiable, for example prohibitions on selling land. The basic argument allows the curtailment of individual rights when they are perceived to threaten the cultural integrity of the group as a whole. Stavenhagen (2002) goes further, offering the proposition that the recognition of group rights may be seen as a condition for the enjoyment of individual rights, but he concedes that such a novel idea is difficult to integrate into Latin America's legal systems (p. 37). Although collective rights are of great concern to indigenous communities, they often face uphill battles because of liberal and neoliberal insistence on the individual as the holder of rights.

**Indigenous Deployment of Culture**

The arrival of multiculturalism played a role in transforming a stigmatized indigenous
identity into one often seen to possess a moral capital sorely lacking in Western society. Some sectors of society have come to see pueblos as representing legitimacy, democracy, and accountability, serving as a moral reproach to status quo hegemonic institutions such as the state and the Church. Authors write about how indigenous leaders, noticing the potential value of the symbolic and political capital attained through the resignification of “indigenous culture,” increase their efforts to revive and strengthen their own institutions. Garfield (2001) describes how the Xavante revived rituals after finding out that the outside world considered them “beautiful” (p. 134).

A newer concept, at times opposed to multiculturality, circulating widely is “interculturality” (Rappaport 2005). Whitten (2004) describes how indigenous organizations in Ecuador oppose it to “an ethos of hybridity or social or cultural pluralism.... Interculturality stresses a movement from one cultural system to another, with the explicit purpose of understanding other ways of thought and action” (p. 440). Whereas the ideologies of social and cultural pluralism and hybridity “are national, regional and static”, formal consciousness of interculturality “is local, regional, plurinational, diasporic, global and dynamic” (p. 440). States have used this nomenclature in school reforms without, however, promoting new curricular materials for nonindigenous students. Indigenous critics of intercultural education reform promulgated by the Bolivian neoliberal state see interculturality to be “neoliberal assimilation” now dressed in native languages” (Gustafson 2002, p. 278; also see Lukyx 2000).

Identity

Intra-pueblo negotiations about who is a member in good standing of a given pueblo can hinge on who decides what constitutes an adequate performance of identity. De la Peña’s discussion of conflict between Huichol traditionalist elders and Evangelical protestants outlines a process of resolving whether Evangelicals who refuse to participate in certain “traditional” community activities have to leave. Each side’s notion of Huichol “culture”—just what constitutes “essential” Huichol identity—revolves around what members need to actually do to affirm (and reaffirm) their right to be considered Huichol. Religious identity and practice seem to be particularly contentious, and research is increasing around these issues (e.g., Canessa 2000, Cleary & Steigenga 2004).

As we have seen above, the relationship between state hegemony and local identity claims can be complex and dynamic. Many authors describe how communities will travel a considerable distance down the road to incorporation—albeit as indigenous “others”—into the state apparatus, including the state playing the role of ultimate juridical authority (Padilla 1996). A community might have to obtain personería jurídica, juridical identity, before it can undertake any kind of legal action for Colombian examples, see Gros (2000) and Rappaport (1996). An emerging problem is the tendency on the part of both pueblos and the state to reify identity. Although a pueblo’s claim to self-determination does not in principle require it to freeze-dry its traditions, this is a common response to criticism that a particular set of behaviors is nontraditional and therefore inauthentic.

Yet it is undeniable that, for many communities, being officially recognized as indigenous affects, sometimes substantially, members’ sense of who they are: “Before, we weren’t registered [with the national bureau of indigenous affairs], we weren’t anything. We are just now starting to be aware of ourselves as an ‘indigenous community’” (Occipinti 2003, pp. 159–60). Some communities prefer pueblo, “people,” to “indigenous” because “pueblo” signals a political discourse that configures the movement as a coalition of cultural groups rather than as a category of oppressed people suffering from
discrimination based on their ethnicity or race.

Negotiations over identity seem to be perennially ambiguous, contingent, and shot through with ironies. Wilson (1995) sees identity to be "irresolvable," possessing an "inherently insecure ontology" (p. 5): "The seemingly contradictory processes of othering and hybridisation are constitutive of each other, dynamically feeding into one another. Identities become interior to each other and implicitly influence the emergence of new identities" (p. 3). One of the several contradictions of identity, according to Wilson (1995), is "that rationality must be present for identity to exist, but the very basis of meaning in difference leads to the crossing-over of signifiers and the undermining of any pretensions to boundedness" (p. 6; see also Wade 1997, pp. 80–83).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The past three decades have seen a profound transformation in Latin American states' visions of their indigenous populations. Many of the most marginalized pueblos gained the most basic right: the "right to have rights" as citizens (Alvarez et al. 1998; Harvey 1998, p. 35). Establishing the right to difference, at both the individual and community level, strengthened demands for autonomy and self-determination because it drove a stake into previous modernist corporatist state projects. Indigenous communities no longer made demands as minorities but as "people" with inherent rights. "Cultural and historical recovery" projects and "inherent rights" demands have been remarkably successful in many countries. However, discourses based on cultural difference do not lead to success everywhere, and they come at a price. At times the emphasis on validation by performing difference has relegated other discourses against racial discrimination and social and economic exclusion to the back of the bus, resulting in problems for Afro-Latinos and rural and urban indigenous communities who can no longer perform cultural difference via language, ritual, or other culture practice (see, e.g., Tilley 2002).

Clearly, much progress has been made in recognizing the rights of people to retain a culture distinct from that of the dominant society. Stavenhagen (2002) notes that, although we should celebrate gains, the struggle for indigenous rights has barely begun, and in the future the going will be rough. Indigenous leaders have not been able to agree on short-term and medium objectives. Also, poorly considered actions taken by some leaders have displeased some potential sympathizers, and all too often truly effective political strategies have not been developed (p. 34). In addition, opponents continue to organize and mount counteroffensives. In countries like Paraguay, indigenous people have been labeled as enemies of the state, and in Guatemala, indigenous organizing is still seen by some critics as a project that promotes racism and class/ethnic conflict (Warren 1998).

Although the amount of territory inalienably and collectively owned by pueblos has increased in several countries, huge problems remain. Colombia has ceded vast areas to lowland groups, but in the more productive highland areas the situation is often dire, and Van Cott (2002, p. 52) notes the failure of three successive governments to establish the Indigenous Territorial Entities mandated by the constitution.

The violent conflicts involving indigenous communities are a continual worry. Not too long ago, armed indigenous insurgents played very visible roles in Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico. Indigenous communities can come to be seen as subversives because they are poor, they live in rural areas, and they mount public demonstrations against a neglectful, exploitative, or terrorist state. Accusations detailing pueblo subversion can serve elites' self-interest in maintaining "the traditional source of cheap labor and political supporters in well-oiled systems of client-patron relationships" (Stavenhagen 2002, p. 37) or can ensure that zero resistance will
greet mega-development projects exploiting subsoil, forest, or hydroelectric resources.

Clearly, the romantic view of pueblos as cohesive and consensus-based collectivities can be sustained only from a distance. Any indigenous community will be riddled with conflicts—some ongoing and others resolved but not forgotten—as well as factions, hierarchies, and decision-making mechanisms that exclude and marginalize some members. It will, in short, display values and actions that are anything but fair, democratic, or egalitarian, as defined and valorized in the West. (Western institutions and values are no less conflict ridden and are certainly more exclusionary.) How to represent such conflicts without giving ammunition to enemies who do not have a given pueblo's interest uppermost in mind is often not at all evident to either the pueblos or their nonindigenous allies.

Other potential threats include a disruptive stratification within the movement and within the communities themselves. “Rights” granted to pueblos can strengthen the sectors already possessing power and weaken the position of subordinates (Stavenhagen 2002).

We close by suggesting especially promising future research directions. The first area concerns ways in which Latin American research articulates with important international issues. Indigenous activism has clearly played an active role in shaping community and multicultural national politics in Latin America. Debates concerning whether the processes of modernity and globalization have homogenized meanings or peoples have produced compelling arguments on both sides.

On a global level, debates over whether ethnic mobilizing has helped or hindered democratization have often emphasized divisive and violent ethnonationalisms. Indigenous movements in Latin America, however, suggest that ethnic mobilization can foster genuine grassroots democratization.

Another line of comparative scholarship challenges the U.S.-centric perspective of international relations research on Latin America. Comparative research on new social movements and different regional histories in Latin America provides crucial analyses of the playing out of geopolitical transformations, such as the consequences of the end of the Cold War, in specific situations. Research into the more recent tensions brought on by waves of neoliberal political and economic pressures also makes valuable contributions, for example, investigations on the effects of U.S. policies like the war on drugs and the war on terrorism in Latin America. In Colombia, U.S. military advisers have directed a militarization of state policing in the war on drugs, and indigenous populations have been caught in the crossfire of these new configurations of violence, produced by armed insurgents, counterinsurgent forces (military and paramilitary), and narco-traffickers.

Territory—gaining land rights—continues to be the prime goal of indigenous organizations. Successful campaigns for collective title, most spectacularly the Awas Tingi decision in Nicaragua, provide encouragement elsewhere in the region. We need to understand these processes, as well as the ways Latin American countries link—or fail to link—territorial jurisdiction and pueblos. In Mexico, the revised 1994 proposal to establish regional autonomy for ethnolinguistic communities does not link it to actual territory; only the right of pueblos to decide their destiny as peoples is mentioned.

Many important opportunities present themselves for research on violent conflicts that involve pueblos. Indigenous people have become internal and international refugees, facing life in refugee camps and employment outside their countries. Many have maintained close connections with their homelands and remitted earnings to their families and community development projects. In these diasporas, some youths have experienced new formations of violence, like U.S. urban gangs, and have introduced gangs into rural Latin American towns. Given the sustained periods of state violence and armed conflict in Latin America, researchers are beginning to investigate indigenous experiences of individual
and collective healing, the reincorporation of former combatants into their communities, and the impact of internationally brokered peace processes and truth commissions (or lack of these processes) on postwar development.

Neoliberal economic reforms have been accompanied by innovative utilization of private international companies that have assumed important state functions. A similar process has involved transnational NGOs in subscribing to a variety of political and religious persuasions. We need to know more about the degree of control these organizations exert on community life, regional and national social movements, and state democratic governance. Serious problems often occur when international NGOs engaged in humanitarianism, postwar reconstruction, and development move on to new crises leaving indigenous organizations bereft of support they have come to depend on. For example, when they are compelled to generate their own operating expenses, indigenous non-profit organizations may be forced to restructure their services to attract new kinds of customers.

Research into the new ways state agencies compete with each other, at times helping indigenous communities resist state programs, is another fruitful direction, as is work on de-mystifying the state as a monolithic entity. Such investigations reveal agencies with a diversity of tendencies. Also welcome is research into situations in which pueblo resistance to state projects is sponsored by capitalist interests, such as logging projects.

Although we have not discussed race and mestizaje, the current research on this constellation of topics is enormously promising, as are approaches that examine the numerous ways all identities are gendered and often sexualized.

A final research frontier is indigenous youth activism, especially important given the growing gaps between rich and poor, and the growing importance of consumer culture, remittance of funds from diasporic communities, and nontraditional forms of work for NGOs. At issue is whether indigenous youth will follow existing forms of indigenous activism, find other movements more compelling, or distance themselves from activism altogether. The younger generation is a heterogeneous category, the members of which see opportunities and constraints from very different cultural and economic vantage points.

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